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TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES 
INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
CARNES CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, and LONG DEMING 
UTAH, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 15928 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES 
INC. I 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
CARNES CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, and LONG DEMING 
UTAH, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 15928 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., brought an action 
for the collection of a sales commission against Carnes Com-
1 pany and Long Deming utah, Inc. An appeal was brought to 
review two decisions of the district court in which two 
different judges ruled that Carnes Company is not subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts. 
Carnes Company is an unincorporated division of Wehr 
Corporation, a foreign corporation not qualified to do business 
in the State of Utah. Carnes Company has appeared specially 
lcarnes Corporation later became an unincorporated divi-
sion of Wehr Corporation, and it is now known as Carnes Company. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for igitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
throughout all of the proceedings in this action, without 
entering a general appearance, and it does not enter a general 
appearance now. 
DISPOSITION IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court reversed the decisions of the district court 
in an opinion filed April 2 4, 1980. It held Carnes Company had 
sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah to justify 
application of the long-arm statute (§§78-27-22-et seq. Utah 
Code Ann. (1953)) and thereby subject it to the jurisdiction of 
the Utah Courts. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Carnes Company respectfully petitions this Court fora 
rehearing of its decision and, then, an affirmance of the dis-
trict court's orders. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A detailed statement of the substantive facts and 
procedural history of this case was set forth in Carnes Com-
pany's initial responsive brief. 2 It is not necessary to 
repeat it here. Any additional factual information necessary 
to the consideration of this matter will be set forth in the 
argument. 
2see Brief of Respondent, at 2-10. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT CARNES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURTS UNDER 
THE LONG-ARM STATUTE. 
Brown insists Carnes has actively transacted business 
in Utah within the meaning of the Utah long-arm statute and is, 
therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts. 
This Court accepted that argument. Carnes urges the Court to 
reconsider because the causes of action alleged by Brown do not 
arise from the Utah activities of Carnes. 
Carnes has never conducted business in Utah to the 
extent that general jurisdiction can be obtained. So, juris-
diction over Carnes, as a non-resident defendant, is controlled 
by the Utah long-arm statute (§§78-27-22-et seq. Utah Code Ann. 
(1953)). In its opinion, the Court relied on two paragraphs of 
§78-27-24. That section provides in pertinant part: 
Any person, notwithstanding section 
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person 
or through an agent does any of the 
following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business 
within the state; 
(2) Contracting to supply services or 
goods in this state; 
* * * 
-3-
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Neither provision supports jurisdiction. It is critical to 
observe that §78-27-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953) 3 permits only 
those claims arising from acts specifically enumerated in 
§78-27-24 to be asserted against a defendant over whom juris-
diction is based on the long-arm statute. Brown's claims did 
not arise from Carnes' contractual agreement to supply equip-
ment to third parties in the State of Utah nor did they arise 
from the transaction of business in this State. There have 
been no claims covering that equipment, either the manner in 
which it was supplied or its quality. This cause of action 
arose, as stated in the complaint, 4 soley from an alleged 
breach and wrongful termination of Brown's sales represen-
tative agreement with Carnes. 
3 Section 78-27-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides: 
"Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be 
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdictior 
over him is based upon this act." 
4 Brown's complaint set forth three counts: (1) that the 
plaintiff's relations hip as sales represen ta ti ve was terminate: 
after the plaintiff had obtained a tentative order for Carnes' 
equipment to be installed in the proposed office building of 
the L.D.S. Church, and before the construction contracts for 
the building were awarded; therefore, plaintiff was entitled t: 
the commission on the equipment eventually ordered, notwith-
standing the subsequent sales agreement between the defendants 
and the provisions of plaintiff's contract; (2) that if not 
entitled to the full commission, plaintiff was entitled to a 
portion of it; and (3) that the defendants had conspired to 
terminate the plaintiff's agreement with Carnes; therefore, 
plaintiff was entitled not only to the commission lost on the 
office building but to other unspecified lost commissions and 
punitive damages as well. (R. 160-163). 
-4-
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Carnes concedes that an action by its purchaser to 
whom it contracted to supply goods and services would lie in 
this state but that is not the basis of Brown's claims. They 
are based on Carnes' termination of a contract, presumably in 
Wisconsin. Such being the case, although Carnes' activities 
would support jurisdiction for some other action under 
§78-27-26, no jurisdiction arises for Brown because of 
§78-27-26. "Contacts" jurisdiction gives jurisdiction only for 
suits involving those contacts. See Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. 
v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978). Identical 
reasoning reaches an identical result under §78-27-24(1): 
Carnes transacted sufficient business in Utah to give juris-
diction in actions based on those Utah activities, i.e., as to 
its buyers, but not as to unrelated causes of action such as 
those alleged by Brown. As in the other elements of the 
long-arm statute, the contacts which establish jurisdiction 
must also establish plaintiff's claims. 5 
5carnes is a Wisconsin corporation not qualified to do 
business in Utah. Clearly Carnes does not have sufficient 
activities in Utah to support a claim of general jurisdiction. 
There would be an obvious constitutional objection, for 
example, to a suit brought in Utah by a Utah corporation whose 
subsidiary in California purchased goods from Carnes.for 
California delivery, or a suit brought by a Utah resldent.for 
personal injury resulting from acts of Carnes' agent outs1de of 
Utah. 
-5-
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The recent decision of Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, 
Inc., P.2d (Utah, No. 15987, filed April 11, 1980), 
is important since it sets forth the standard to be applied 
here. Plaintiff, a local firm, alleged it made an oral 
agreement with defendant, a Kentucky fabricating company. T~ 
agreement would have allowed the Utah company to earn a 
"finder's fee" for services in connection with the sale of 
goods in Utah. However, according to plaintiff, the finder's 
fee was never paid and so it filed a lawsuit. Defendant 
responded to the suit by alleging the court did not have 
jurisdiction in the case because the company had no purposeful 
contacts in the state and never really conducted business 
here. The trial court ruled jurisdiction existed. 
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the reco~ 
di C: !10t show the defendant was doing business in Utah to such 
an extent that the courts would have general jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the plaintiff was required to show that its cau: 
of action arose out of one or more of defendant's contacts wi~ 
the state as set forth in §78-27-24. As the Court observed, 
the plaintiff could not meet the evidentiary requirement: 
Plaintiff argues that the "minimal contact" test of 
International Shoe is satisfied, as defendant transacted. 
business in this State, contracted to supply goods in th1' 
State, and defendant's employees were physically present 
this State. 
But we are not here concerned with defendant's 
contract for the sale of goods to U.S. Steel Credit 
Corporation, nor with the installation of the equipment' 
-6-
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the Utah American Steel plant, and plaintiff's claim does 
not arise ?ut of those activities. Plaintiff's alleged 
contract w1th defendant 1s collateral to its''activities 
re~ating to the sale of equipment to U.S. Steel Corpor-
atlon, and such a contract between plaintiff and defendant 
would portray plaintiff's, and not defendant's, services ' 
and activities within this State. 
* * * 
Here, defendant's purposeful activities within this 
State consisted of its sale of equipment ultimately 
destined for installation in this State, and its entry into 
this State for the purpose of overseeing the installation 
of that equipment. These contacts would be sufficient for 
the establishment of limited jurisdiction if this liti-
gation concerned an action for breach of warranty or 
negligence in installing the equipment, brought by Utah 
American Steel or U.S. Steel Credit Corporation, but this 
plaintiff cannot avail himself of such contacts for the 
purpose of his claim or an enitrely different contract. To 
do so he must show that this State has general jurisdic-
tion; to wit, the defendant has conducted substantial and 
continuous business in this State. Plaintiff has shown no 
purposeful activity on the part of defendant within this 
State by which it could be said that defendant knew or 
should have known that is was subjecting itself to the 
jurisdiction of our Courts, for the purposes of this al-
leged contract for commissions. P.2d at 
(Footnote omitted.) 
II. THE COURT DID NOT ADDRESS JUDGE 
LEARY'S REFUSAL, AS A MATTER OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, TO PERMIT 
RELITIGATION OF THE ISSUE OF JURIS-
DICTION. 
It is evident the Court did not address the juris-
dictional issue on the basis of the evidence before Judge Hall 
in 1974. Judge Leary, in addition to considering the issue on 
the merits, took into account that there were no changes in 
circumstances or other factors which as a matter of judicial 
administration should permit Brown to litigate the jurisdic-
tional issue twice. This question of fairness and judicial 
administration is different from the principle of res judicata 
-7-
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referred to in Justice Crockett's concurring opinion. In 
fairness to the trial court, the question should be addressed 
by this Court. Carnes discussed the question on the merits in 
its Brief. 6 
III. THE COURT FAILED TO DETERMINE 
THE ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE 
FINAL DECISIONS AND ARE APPEALABLE. 
Finally, Carnes is obligated to note to the Court, as 
it did in its brief, 7 that the two orders appealed by Brown 
were not final decisions and, consequently, they were not 
iTIDedia~ly app~lable to this Court. Rule 54 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure
1
governs the entry of a judgment in 
actions such as this one with multiple parties. It is readi~ 
apparent from a review of the record that Brown did not comp~ 
with the requirements of the Rule. The orders are, therefore, 
not now appealable. 
Recently, the Court has dismissed other appeals whe~ 
the judgment to be reviewed was not final and the parties had 
not met the requirements of Rule 54(b). See, e.g., South 
Shores Concession, Inc. v. Utah, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979); ~ 
Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979); Kenned~ 
New Era Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979). Here, 
6 See Brief of Respondent, at 15-18. 
7see Brief of Respondent, at 11-15. 
-8-
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however, the Court's decision did not address the issue. 
Carnes urges the Court to do so and, on that basis, dismiss the 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Carnes Company respectfully 
petitions this Court for a rehearing of its decision and, then, 
an affirmance of the district court's orders. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of May, 1980. 
~i 
of the firm of 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
-9-
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Carnes Corp. 
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